The choroid plexuses (CPs) are involved in the most-basic aspects of neural function including maintaining the extracellular milieu of the brain by actively modulating chemical exchange between the CSF and brain parenchyma, surveying the chemical and immunological status of the brain, detoxifying the brain, secreting a nutritive “cocktail” of polypeptides and participating in repair processes following trauma. This diversity of functions may mean that even modest changes in the CP can have far-reaching effects. Indeed, changes in the anatomy and physiology (...) of the CP have been linked to aging and several CNS diseases. It is also possible that replacing diseased or transplanting healthy CP might be useful for treating acute and chronic brain diseases. This review focuses on the wide-ranging and under-appreciated functions of the CP, alterations of these functions in aging and neurodegeneration, and recent demonstrations of the therapeutic potential of transplanted CP for neural trauma. BioEssays 27:262–274, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

Catalogue of an exhibition which addresses contemporary printmaking issues/concerns within a Tasmanian context.

Konflikte im moralischen Urteil gibt es zwischen Moralphilosophien, zwischen Kulturen, Personen und selbst innerhalb eines einzelnen Bewusstseins. Die moderne Forschung aus verschiedensten Fachbereichen zeigt, dass unser moralischer Sinn dabei offenbar keiner einheitlichen Logik folgt. Menschen unterscheiden ihre Beziehungen gemäß dreier Kategorien: "Interaktion", "Identität" und "Intimität". Jede einzelne lässt sich als eine evolutionäre Anpassung verstehen. Die Meta-Kategorie "Universalität" entsteht dagegen wohl nur unter günstigen Bedingungen und als ein evolutionäres Nebenprodukt. Urteile darüber "was man tun soll" und "was man nicht tun darf" (...) erweisen sich in diesem Kontext als abhängig vom Beziehungstyp und Konflikte im Urteil sind in einer sozialen Welt systembedingt. Das Modell einer "Beziehungstypischen Ethik", das auf dieser evolvierten Psychologie basiert, bietet somit die Grundlage für ein besseres Verständnis der gesamten menschlichen Ethik einschließlich der Moralphilosophien. Daneben bietet die Arbeit eine für die deutschsprachige Literatur bislang einzigartige Einführung in die Neue Synthese der Evolutionstheorie, sowie einen neuartigen Ansatz für den gelingenden Dialog zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften. (shrink)

Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can nevertheless yield (...) important insight into the sorts of creatures we are, both generally and individually. The experience of retrospective regret can show a person she values something in a way she did not know or that she is (or was) a different person than she had thought, insights which can factor into forward-looking, or prospective, deliberation. Such instances of revelatory regret reveal something to the agent about herself as agent. I examine two cases of agential self-ignorance. In the first, the experience of regret reveals what the agent values, not only to others but even to the agent himself. In the second, the agent anticipates experiencing regret for an action but does not experience the regret, suggesting that the agent did not value the rejected alternative in the way she thought. Anticipatory regret is forward-looking and can play an important role in practical deliberation. But insofar as anticipatory regret flows from one’s imperfect judgment and prospection about oneself, retrospective regret can be an important corrective in helping the agent understand her own standpoint. (shrink)

It is not quite as easy to see that there is in fact no formula of this modal language having the same truth conditions (in terms of S5 Kripke semantics) as (1). This was rst conjectured by Allen Hazen2 and later proved by Harold Hodes3. We present a simple direct proof of this result and discuss some consequences for the logical analysis of ordinary modal discourse.